"Bioterrorism is a real threat to your country. It’s a risk to every nation that loves liberty. Terrorist organizations seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have them….It’s important that people confront these serious threats to our country and prepare for future emergencies."
-President George W. Bush June 12, 2002
Biological weapons are one of the primary threats we deal with today. They are potentially simply because deadly as nuclear weapons and may leave a location contaminated for weeks. Not surprisingly however, the threat of biological weapons will not seem to become a major priority of our current administration. There appears to become a significant rush to implement counter-terrorism guidelines that give attention to more conventional means of attacks and more especially those attacks that people have already experienced. Consequently, we see many improvement in the screening of airline travellers and the regulation of classic explosives, but no further regulation of biological weapons, dispersion systems, or the implementation of better response techniques. Therefore, more should be done to avoid biological attacks and prepare our country to respond in the case there is one.
According to the Terrorism Understanding Bottom, since nineteen sixty eight there have been a complete of thirteen incidents concerning biological weapons with forty-six accidental injuries, and six fatalities. Of these thirteen incidents, nine of these have taken place in the United States, with all of the injuries, and five out of six of the deaths all occurring in the usa as well. If these figures are examined in an over-all sense and in comparison to other weapons found in terrorists episodes (bombs, fire, firearms, etc) then your tendency of biological terrorism will not seem very important. However, the reality is that the even more technologically advanced we become globally, the more efficient biological weapons and their dispersion systems become, and the greater the danger is for an strike. We are currently in a day and time where scientific discovery, and advancements in biology are putting us at risk for an attack from a terrorist group, and even an individual with access to biological weapons and a grudge.
In order to repair our current system, revision of our current plans must be done, in addition to creation of new policies and types of procedures to mitigate the danger. This paper will provide details on our current plans, how the issues with out current policies could be set, and a risk evaluation of the Brazos Valley with specific emphasis on the Texas A good&M University System.
The following will be the policies that have been developed in response to the risk of biological weapons. All polices relating to biological weapons should have two parts: prevention of a biological weapon attack, and response after a biological attack. While every is important on its own, together they make a thorough plan to create policies around. Before any recommendations can be made, on the other hand, our current policies should be known and judged against the danger we currently face.
There are three key policies and plans concerning biological weapons which have come from the White Residence. They are Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 10, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, and Project Bioshield. Jointly these are made to provide us with optimum protection and response in the case of a biological threat.
Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 10 (Biodefense for the 21st Century):
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 features four major goals as outlined by the White Home: threat awareness, avoidance and coverage, surveillance and recognition, and response and recovery. Each one of these is an integral part of the overall plan.
In purchase for our government to get ready for a biological attack, we must know the type of the threat. That’s where the “Threat Recognition” pillar comes into play. This pillar seeks to supply our government with the ability to use technology and cleverness to provide the most realistic appraisal of our current risk. The concept of threat awareness we can create functional policies specifically crafted around our current threat. There will be three totals components of the threat recognition pillar: biological warfare related intelligence, assessments, and anticipation of future threats.
Biological warfare related cleverness is the name given to the process of using the cleverness community (Central Intelligence Company, National Security Agency, and others) to gather all information regarding biological weapons. This would involve overseas missions for intelligence gathering purposes, creation of systems to investigate collected data, and the dissemination of that data to all important celebrations. Biological warfare related intelligence also incorporates Red Teaming, a term indicating the team in a preparedness exercise (similar to a battle game) whose role is usually to simulate enemy techniques. “Red Teaming efforts are used to understand new scientific trends that may be exploited by our adversaries to build up biological weapons also to help position intelligence collectors ahead of our problem.” (www.whitehouse.gov)
Assessments will be the second component of the threat awareness pillar. “The Unites States requires a continuous, formal process for conducting routine capacities assessments to guide prioritization of our on-going investments in biodefense-related research, development, planning and preparedness.” (www.whitehose.gov) The Division of Homeland Reliability will be made in charge of gathering information and creation of periodical assessments and making advice of division of solutions based on the assessment.
The anticipation of near future threats element asserts that the need to stay current with existing technology can be of superb importance. It permits the government the government to anticipate and prepare for the emergence of different threats (www.whitehouse.gov). How these assessments should be done and what accurately is to be included in them, is not mentioned in the Light House’s edition of Homeland Protection Presidential Directive ten on the other hand.
Prevention and Protection
The first element of the prevention and coverage pillar is proactive prevention. As explained by the White Residence, “preventing biological weapons episodes is by far the most cost-effective approach to biodefense.” This will come to be accomplished by limiting gain access to of biological brokers and dispersal solutions to countries, groups, or people seeking to develop, produce, and work with these agents. (www.whitehouse.gov) This will be completed using police investigative methods, diplomacy, and export settings. Agencies in charge of prevention are the Department of State, Division of Defense, Division of Justice, and the intelligence community, but specific duties aren’t given.
The second element of prevention and protection is critical infrastructure protection. The directive explains that safety of critical infrastructure, specifically in the case of those that would be important after an assault (public health, food, normal water, energy, agriculture, transport, etc.) should be protected. Once again, details as to how that is to be done are not given, only that it should be done.
Surveillance and Detection
The first component of the surveillance and recognition pillar is attack warning. This would entail the advancement of an attack warning system, very similar to extreme weather warning systems, “which rapidly recognizes and characterizes the dispersal of biological agents.” The logic behind this component of surveillance and recognition is an efficient and powerful response can be mounted to counter the threat if the biological agent used in an attack is able to be detected and characterized earlier.
The second element of surveillance and detection is attribution. The ability to attribute an attack to a particular country, group, or person might help authorities to deter attacks with the assurance of severe repercussions to the group or country that perpetrates the assault. The recently created National Bioforensic Analysis Centre of the National Biodefense Examination and Countermeasure Centre is in charge of the let’s learn how to write a summary paper examination of the biological agent, and interpretation of info to determine responsibility. This idea has been tried for lesser crimes (three-strike regulations) with varied degrees of success.
Response and Recovery
The parts of the response and restoration attack are various. But this is required as the response after an strike is an enormous intricate undertaking. This part of the Directive 10 comprises: response planning, mass casualty treatment, risk connection, medical countermeasure development, and decontamination.
Response planning is the main section of the response and restoration pillar. With out a reasonable plan of strike, nothing can be accomplished. Evidence of this idea is seen in the days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina, when recovery initiatives were mishandled by Federal government Emergency Management Organization due in large part to ill-preparedness. As part of this component, the strategies are also to be tested frequently at the neighborhood, state, and federal government level. Mass casualty treatment, decontamination, and medical countermeasure all get together in preventing lack of life after an attack. To ensure that all of these to occur, there needs to be funding in areas of research regarding countermeasures of biological agents, and in addition funding in the general public health arena in a way that all medical establishments are adequately prepared to handle this event. This includes stocking medical services with countermeasures and keeping them up to date with terrorism activities via a communication network.
Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 21
Released October two-thousand seven, Homeland Security Presidential Directive twenty-one in a more comprehensive variation of the response and recover pillar of Homeland Security Presidential Directive ten. It delves into exactly how we start preparing for the aftermath of a biological strike. The five key priorities / goals when contemplating preparedness are: preparedness for all potential catastrophic overall health situations; vertical and horizontal coordination across levels of government, jurisdictions and disciplines; a regional approach to overall health preparedness; engagement of the individual sector, academia, and various other nongovernmental entities in preparedness and response work; and the important functions of people, families, and communities. To accomplish these priorities, Homeland Security Presidential Directive twenty-one outlines many actions that must definitely be implemented to mount a successful response to a biological attack. These are mostly the same as those brought up in Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive ten; on the other hand, the best difference is in the case of Homeland Protection Presidential Directive twenty-one, deadlines will be established concerning when these ought to be done.
Biosurveillance calls for the establishment of a “national epidemiological surveillance system for human health.” This might entail an electric network linking federal, express and local public wellbeing assets. This technique would also need to protect patient privacy, while giving access to those medical professionals most likely to come into contact with the agents. This network would likewise incorporate keeping medical researchers abreast in what to look for in the form of symptoms. The deadline for this goal was one-hundred eighty days, but only essential meetings to examine progress.
Countermeasure stockpiling and distribution
Countermeasure stockpiling and distribution calls for the creation of a plan to amass a way to obtain common countermeasures including antibiotics, anti-virals and others. The countermeasure stockpiling and distribution portion of the directive mandates a template or arrange for these efforts will be created within nine a few months of its release date, but once more, does not explain specifically how anything is usually to be done, only that it ought to be within nine months.
Mass Casualty Care
Through a joint work between the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Security, Veteran Affairs, and Homeland Security, professionals at the state, federal and private levels are to supply feedback on “high-priority gaps in mass casualty care capabilities.” After this event, there is to be an analysis of the info in order to build a plan for mass
casualty attention after a biological strike. This plan would call for changes in out public health system particularly geared towards biodefense, and not towards enhancing our public health system all together.
Perhaps the main component of Homeland Security presidential Directive 21, this section encourages engaging residents in education and risk awareness in the region of biological weapons. Civic leaders, citizens and family members should be educated such that they could lessen a number of the risk in their respective areas.
The Project Bioshield Work of 2004 was signed on June 21, 2004 by current President George W. Bush. Project Bioshield deals specifically with the expansion and the procurement of countermeasures from pharmaceutical companies. The signing of the Job Bioshield Work allowed for the creation of seventy-five million dosages of anthrax vaccines for stockpiling, development of botulinum antitoxin, and development of a safer smallpox toxin. Project Bioshield isn’t designed to fix all of our problems, but solve a large problem in the lack of response resources.
Problems with our current system and policies
Our current biological weapons policies consist largely of Homeland Secureness Presidential Directives ten and twenty-one and the Task Bioshield Act. Jointly, they represent the virtually all comprehensive plan we’ve, but still fall short of featuring us with the cover and reliability from what President Bush describes as a “real threat to our region.” While our current program provides a good base for a biological weapons defense policy, it has many important gaps. Our current guidelines display one key flaw inside our biodefense plan: we know very well what to do, but not how to complete it. In the summary of all three areas of our biodefense policy, there is absolutely no detailed plan of how to repair the holes in our system. Also, despite released in April two-thousand four, lots of the objectives seen Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive ten, are yet incomplete; particularly regarding the “Response and Recovery” objective. What this means is we are not following the plans we have set up to prevent and react to bioterrorism. In two-thousand one, approximately one-1 / 2 a billion us dollars w as spent on civilian biodefense. Every year since that time, the spending has gone up with spending achieving around seven and one-half billion us dollars. (Schuler 88) We will be considerably beyond we had been in two-thousand one, but still significantly lacking in bio-terrorism security.
There are only a couple of things we currently lack, but they are very important to our security. First of all we lack a good public health program. “The basic wants of bioterrorism preparedness stay the essential tasks of public well being- identifying unusual disease incidents, their trigger, and intervening to alleviate the situation” (Avery 284) The federal government is wanting to pump more resources right into a flawed system. With out a good public health program, any biodefense plan finally falls aside because our public overall health system is of utmost importance in response efforts.
Another big flaw inside our system is the lack of talented people. Having wonderful policies and resources but lacking talented employees to put them into practice is unacceptable. Federal agencies are losing potential staff to the non-public sector when the demand for security talent will to continue rise by as very much as twenty-five percent through the year two-thousand ten. (Partnership for Public Service 224) Guidelines cannot be put into action without talented persons leading them. It is estimated that nearly half of the federal government employees in occupations critical to out biodefense will be eligible to retire next five years. (Executive Overview 224).
An additional significant error with our current system is insufficient action. While our current plans are not perfect, they do give a very good base plan. So why are we certainly not where we need to be? The reason could be budget concerns, or biological weapons are less of important than they must be, but whatever the reason, creation of plans without placing them into action leaves us at risk. In Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive 21, it calls for general public outreach and education to see the general public regarding the risks of biological weapons, and how to reach regarding the attack, but it has not been done. In Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 10, a biosurveillance program is proposed to retain our public health facilities informed concerning emerging threats and suspicious happenings in other areas of the country. As the directive was released in two-thousand four, this has not been accomplished.
Proposed Biological Terrorism Prevention and Response Plan
Our current guidelines and recent activities have provided us with an excellent foundation to build a solid biological weapons prevention and response plan on. However, so as to mitigate the threat extra needs to be done. My plan has the potential to fill in the majority of the holes in our current policy / program. I propose several alterations in out current program and guidelines. My proposed will emphasize all areas of security (prevention and response). Our current public health appears to be the most important portion of the equation, so this can be where my biodefense approach will begin.
In buy to mount a competent response in the aftermath of an strike, we must have a well-organized general public health system. This particular part of the plan would demand government-funded upgrades in public health facilities. As stated previously, an analysis of our current open public health system shows that “upgrading public health services for broad based-surveillance avoids the threat of tunnel vision that’s inherent in the bioterrorism-specific approach.” (Avery 285) Upgrades to our public health facilities will include bigger stockpiles of antibiotics, anti-virals, and other countermeasures. Relating to Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive 21, “few if any locations are presently in a position to meet the goal of dispensing countermeasures with their entire human population within forty-eight hours following the decision to do so.” These stockpiles should be large enough to aid in the response after most any disaster, and positioned in such places that they could be sent to afflicted areas within twenty-four time. Proximity to a significant metropolitan area shouldn’t be a concern in response initiatives. This phase would also require coordination with biotechnology and pharmaceutical corporations to coordinate and distribute items of counter-measures to many regions in each express. Other responsibilities of our current general public health system include vaccination of general public. This would be better beyond our current status.
The next step in upgrading out open public health system is employees training and education. Biological weapons can employ probably the most deadly bacteria and infections in the world. Medical personnel ought to be trained in the recognition and treatment of the very most deadly agents. This might necessitate training provided by the Center for Disease Control and various other similarly competent exclusive sector facilities and professionals. While many biological agents present with peculiar symptoms, many present with flu-like symptoms and will be conveniently confused with other much less lethal illnesses. All of this information needs to make its way to not only our physicians and nurses, but those involved with public health.
The last step of my public overall health plan may be the creation of a centralized network available to all public health establishments. This network would be created and taken care of by the government using such agencies as the guts for Disease Control and the National Institute of Well being. This network / data source would track the progression of illnesses and symptoms through the entire country. It would also serve as a connection between facilities. In case of an attack in a single part of the country, all facilities can be put on alert almost instantly. This could cause significantly less deaths during the aftermath of an attack, and aid in the day to day functions of our country’s general public health system.
Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 10 is a general diagram for both avoidance and response. While it outlines both aspects, it generally does not go into great detail concerning how its plans should be accomplished. The same can be said for Homeland Protection Presidential Directive 21. Our major policies usually do not give a detailed photo of what out preliminary response plan is. We can not organize a functional response if we usually do not possess a nation-wide incident response plan for a biological attack. Hence Phase II will be the creation of an intensive plan that is able to be utilized in every regions of the united states. One standardized method would alleviate any indecisiveness when determining what to do for a specific region as well as make training easier. With one standardized approach there is absolutely no question of what the neighborhood government is to accomplish, everything is prepared and only has to be executed.
This plan could have three major goals: defining authority after an attack, setup a timeline for when response attempts must be completed, and offer a basis for training first responders and different billed with response. In the aftermath of an attack authority is always a problem. Because agencies frequently have different ideas about how response should proceed, authority should be defined before an attack ever happens. The two alternatives for authority are federal government and status with each having their positive aspects. Federal companies have near limitless means when compared to state agencies. They usually are in a position to procure and implement necessary resources considerably faster. State agencies have the advantage of local knowledge. Local knowledge of a particular region and its own working is an invaluable asset during circumstances of disaster. Federal agencies cannot possibly all aspects of a particular region and so this responsibility falls to the state. State governments likewise the advantage of to be able to react more quickly due to their close proximity to the afflicted area. So the best compromise between the two would be joint authority shared between the state government (governor, mayors, metropolis managers, etc.), and a representative of the federal government designated by the president. Because a plan will already be in place prior to an attack, the state could have a definitive idea within the days following an attack. After the government representative arrives, they are able to work as a cohesive crew to plan the best plan of action.
Along with defining authority, the national response system should define timelines as to when certain actions are to be taken. Phase one of this plan would make certain that countermeasures were available in the function of a biological assault. This timeline would build when these countermeasures are to be given,
Our current president provides described biological weapons as an extremely serious threat. Mitigation of the threat may be accomplished, but needs specialized activities from personnel trained in biology along with investigative techniques. Phase II would demand the creation of a company dedicated to the risk of bioterrorism. The First step of stage II is finding persons with various experience (science, investigation, intelligence gather, etc.) to do the job in this agency. Bioterrorism is a substantially different threat than most conventional methods of terrorism. To mount an excellent defense / offense, it requires a deep understanding of biology, biochemistry, virology, and several other biological
sciences. Investigating offenses including such agents cannot be done without the correct knowledge and working experience. Most agencies presently tasked with counter-terrorism do not have the requisite personnel with science backgrounds, nor the assets to handle their other responsibilities and the risk from bioterrorism. The necessity for people with competence in those areas possesses been established as is yet unfulfilled. We can not properly stop a threat if those that are tasked with this responsibility have no idea everything there is to learn about the threat. The first step would be to obtain the right staff for the firm. The agency would be made up of doctors, scientists, policy makers, first of all responders, investigators (law enforcement), security employees, and any other required personnel to mount a thorough response.
The next step is always to define the tasks of the organization. I propose this company be in charge of investigation of biological weapons threats, regulation of biological brokers, working in tandem with intelligence firms here and overseas, and working with various other testmyprep.com countries to insure the regulation of stated materials there aswell. These obligations are no small task. They will require many hours of intelligence gathering, diplomacy, investigation, and law enforcement. The scope of the agency would be extensive, but still well within reach if done properly. This agency would need to utilize techniques used by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Government Bureau of Investigations, and several other similar agencies as a way to reach such significant goals.
Phase IV would consist of general public education / outreach. The group of people most vulnerable to biological attacks is everyday citizens. If we are to safeguard the public, they must be educated concerning risks, current counter procedures, and how to proceed regarding an attack. That’s where the educational outreach programs would enter. They would must be non-invasive as in a pamphlet given out to each patient after a doctors go to, or educational videos provided to employers to be shown at career orientations. Using this idea could save us vast amounts of dollars in expenditures after an attack by saving enough time and effort in organizing and coordinating open public actions.
Phase V would consist of training those people accountable for first response. Our 1st line of defense isn’t government agencies, but the people who happen to be closest to the strike; this will always be local law enforcement, firefighters, and local public health staff. Current regional law enforcement agencies happen to be unprepared and unknowledgeable about probably biological attacks and they of all responders will be well versed in what things to expect and how to react after a biological attack. Period V would mandate training of most probably first responders at least one time a year. This training would include simulated attacks in a simulated environment. All those that would be involved in the response efforts will be trained in what to do, and then using that training to a simulated strike. This training would also help the general public rest easier understanding that their first responders are ready for the opportunity of a biological attack.
Advantages vs. Disadvantages
Advantages: The greatest strength of the proposed method is its comprehensiveness. This course of action covers all areas of biological terrorism (prevention and response) together with addressing the existing holes in our system. It provides us with the best possible response, along with directing preventative methods prior to an attack. Agencies dedicated to specific purposes have an extended history of performance as can be seen in the Center for Disease Control and various other similar agencies. This plan could not work if the duties were placed after another agency currently tasked with different unrelated obligations. Biological weapons will be too great a risk to be relegated to 1 of the many duties of an agency with a great many other missions. Also compared to outsourcing these responsibilities to the individual sector, this proposal symbolize a way of maintaining security, but likewise retaining faith in out federal government. Most citizens need to know that their government is more than capable of protecting them from major protection threats. This proposal has the good thing about allowing all responsibilities to stay in house such that there is absolutely no division of tasks between government and exclusive. This proposal also permits improvements in out current countermeasure stockpiles, a public more concerned with their own basic safety, and a standardized response strategy such that
Disadvantages: The greatest thing working against a company of this type is expense. As mentioned previously, biodefense funding has gone up significantly yearly since two-thousand one. (Schuler 88) An idea of this magnitude will be costly. Also, creating of another firm has the possibility of earning an currently confusing counter-terrorism considerably more perplexing.
Brazos Valley threat assessment
All the problems that plague the nation in mention of a biological weapons risk are compounded in the Brazos valley Spot. The main industry in the region is Texas A&M University, which is also could be considered a higher value target.
A threat assessment may very well be having three ingredients: the danger to a focus on, the target’s vulnerability to the danger, and the consequences should the target be successfully attacked. (Willis 16) In this regard the chance assessment regarding the Brazos Valley is normally three-parted.
Threat to the mark:
According to the CDC, bioterrorism agents are typically split into three categories: groups A, B, and C (www.cdc.gov). Category A organisms contain biological brokers with both a higher prospect of adverse public health impression and that likewise have a serious potential for large-scale dissemination. Category B brokers are moderately simple to disseminate and also have low mortality costs. Category C agents are pathogens that might be designed for mass dissemination because they are easy to produce and also have potential for large morbidity or mortality. Predicated on information gathered from interviews with Associate Chief Freddy Komar of the Bryan Police Division and Doctor Garry Adams of the Texas A good&M University University of Veterinary Medicine, the biggest threat to Texas A&M and the encompassing areas may be the dissemination of a Category A good organism, more particularly one that could be conveniently ported to an aerosol method of dispersal. With a highly effective dispersal in a highly populated and confined region or event like a football game at Kyle Field, the destructive potential is massive.
As an agricultural staple, the Brazos Valley Spot
Target’s Vulnerability to Danger:
The authorities of the Brazos Valley functions in a continuous condition of alertness regarding to an Interview with Mr. Bill May possibly. Using the Texas A good&M University Engineering Expansion Provider (TEEX), the Brazos Valley trains emergency employees from all over the world at the demand of their home agency. TEEX uses a huge training facility to supply simulated disasters so that you can prepare the trainees for just about any type of disaster. TEEX is different from other agencies for the reason that it provides the most realistic training within the country, if not the universe. However, this only manages the aftermath. The front line of defense is the local law enforcement branches. In talking to the assistant chief of police, I came across that while Texas A&M is usually a veritable hub for disaster training, the first line of defense against bio-terrorist episodes (local police) are not been trained in what to do to avoid local terrorist episodes, identify probably terrorist tendencies, and how exactly to properly manage someone suspected to be a terrorist. This responsibility falls mainly to the closest FBI field office which is situated ninety miles apart in Houston, Texas. Both Bryan and College Stations Police Departments depend on a company ninety miles away, and this is a huge mistake that both departments have to fix immediately.
Consequences Should the Target be Successfully Attacked:
Texas A&M University is probably the most likely goal for a bio-terrorist assault in the Brazos Valley Region. It has a sizable concentration of people, a lot of open space, and students body wholly unaware of their surroundings. Texas A&M is a place where many different people from many different parts of the world co-exist in a single large area. It is an available campus with a police that is too little to monitor such a big area with so many places to cover. A bio-terrorist attack would at the very worst kill thousands of people depending on the technique of dispersal, organism, and weather. It would also cripple the market of the point out of Texas for years to come.
The most important proven fact that the interviewees could offer me was that the fight terrorism includes two major tasks; strong training and education. These ideas are extremely rarely addressed in both case of the general public, and more importantly, the local law enforcement agencies. This is exactly what comprises the largest portion of our risk, and if improved, the Brazos Valley’s already low risk issue would plummet even more.
How to Fix the Problem:
The deficiencies aren’t hard to fix, but as mentioned by Doctor Adams, politics and funds get in the way. What is needed is normally: A federally regulated and funded program with common types of procedures for all of the states, but also a person expert in each state that has the ability to cater response techniques to each area. The system that is used now could be different for each and every state, and some work superior to others. As defined above, the incident commander system that Texas uses is very useful, but as with everything has faults. I feel a uniformed system is just about the best way to minimize the faults. Financing, as always, is necessary to train personnel and also to hire experienced folks who can handle handling large and dense populations. To enhance the allocation of homeland secureness resources and thereby to lessen loss of life and real estate to terrorism or minimize poor investments in homeland protection measures if attacks do not take place, it is essential to have great estimates of the terrorism risk to which diverse regions or organizations are uncovered (manuscript). Risk and event models predicated on population size and density happen to be needed so as to properly educate the city. Especially those communities that are in greater risks should be discovered and educated with community outreach and television set programs on local stations. Training of localized law enforcement and emergency response organizations would greatly improve not only the response to attacks, but also prevention of attacks by helping them determine possible targets, suspect tendencies, and various other precursors to an attack.
Avery, George. Bioterrorism, Fear, and Public Wellbeing Reform: Matching an insurance plan Solution to the incorrect Window. “Public Administration Analysis” Vol. 64, No. 3, May/June 2004 275-288
Schuler, Ari. Billions of Biodefense: Federal Company Biodefense Funding, FY2001—FY2005 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Technique, Practice, and Science. Vol 2, No. 2 2004, 86-97
Partnership for Public Service. Homeland Insecurity: Setting up the Expertise to guard America from Terrorism. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Technique, Practice, and Technology. Vol. 1 No. 3, 2003 223-224.
Willis, Henry; Morral, Andrew; Kelly, Terrence; Medby, Jamison. "Estimating Terrorism Risk." Rand Corporation. (2005): 1-56.
Komar, Freddie. Personal Interview. 28 June 2007.
May, Costs. Personal Interview. 26 July 2007.
Adams, Garry. Personal Interview. 2 Aug. 2007.
Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases. July 2007. Centre for Disease Control. 30 November 2007. .